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In the dissertation, I discuss how information intermediaries influence markets with consumer
search frictions, especially in big tech and Internet industries. I study both theoretically and empiri-
cally how the information that platforms as Amazon, Google, Expedia, etc. have about consumers’
preferences affects market efficiency, market prices, and welfare.
In the first chapter, I empirically study how the information a search intermediary has about
consumer preferences impacts the market. Consumers participate in costly search among different
sellers products, relying on the rankings order provided by the intermediary based on their pref-
erences. Better product targeting affects consumer search and purchases, which, in turn, changes
the seller pricing incentives. I considered these aspects by modeling both sides of the market un-
der various ranking algorithms used by the intermediary. On the demand side, I develop a model
consumer costly search and purchase joint decision. On the supply side, I model the firms pricing
game. To estimate the demand and supply models, I utilized a rich dataset provided by Expedia,
which includes consumer search and purchase data and information on the hotels and prices they
charge. I find that if the intermediary uses data on consumers preferences to provide them person-
alized rankings of products, consumers, on average, experience a 3.6% ($4.9) utility decrease due
to increased transaction prices, a 0.8% ($1.1) utility gain due to a reduction in search spending,
and 0.5% ($0.7) utility gain due to finding a better-fitted hotel.
The second chapter provides the theoretical model to discuss markets with consumer search
frictions and a partially informed intermediary. The intermediary gives consumers individual ad-
vice on what products to explore first. The main finding is that with an improvement in the infor-
mation the intermediary has, the average quality of the product consumers purchase, as well as the
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total economic welfare and the consumer surplus, might decrease. The mechanism is as follows: if
the intermediary gives better advice on average to consumers on what product to explore first, all
consumers have lower expectations about the next products and explore them less often. That re-
duces the quality of products purchased by consumers who got wrong advice and might lower the
average quality of purchased products. This effect appears in the case of a low search cost, which
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CHAPTER 1
CONSUMER DATA AND CONSUMER WELFARE: EVIDENCE FROM THE HOTEL
BOOKING MARKET.
1.1 Introduction
Platforms like Google, Amazon, Facebook, Expedia, etc., collect enormous amounts of data
about consumers’ preferences and behavior. Although they claim to use these data to provide
better services to customers, a discussion has recently been raging about whether we should allow
these tech giants to collect and use our personal data? While the central part of this discussion is
about privacy and human rights, it also raises economic questions. How does it change competition
between firms that advertise on platforms? How does it change market prices? How does consumer
welfare change? Does it really help provide the best service to consumers or simply increase tech
giants’ potential to control markets?
Consumers often are initially uninformed about the quality of the products available on the
market. They may conduct a costly search to learn about product qualities, and in many cases, these
searches are facilitated by information intermediaries. For example, online platforms as Amazon
and Expedia provide consumers ranked lists of products. Nowadays, in the Internet era, consumers
conduct much lower search costs and have access to a much wider set of products to choose from.
Therefore, consumers as never before are dependent on platforms steering their search for products
that provide a ranking of products. Using personal consumer data on preferences helps platforms to
provide more accurate rankings to consumers. This paper highlights how market outcomes change
if platforms collect and use personal consumer data on preferences.
Due to the presence of the search frictions, consumers explore not all products before making
purchase decisions. As a result, the platform’s ranking algorithm’s change leads to a change in con-
sumer demand function since consumers are more likely to explore products on higher positions
in the ranking ceteris paribus. Better ranking helps consumers easier and faster find better-suited
products, reducing search expenditures and procuring a better product match. However, if con-
sumers change search behavior in equilibrium, sellers also change their behavior. With a better
ranking, consumers find well-suited products higher in the list and have lower incentives to search
further, which shrinks their consideration sets and changes the demand elasticity, which, in turn,
relaxes competition between sellers and changes their pricing strategies. Thus the effect of better
ranking on consumer welfare is ambiguous without additional analysis.
In this paper, I address how the market prices, consumer and economic welfare, and the quality
of the purchased products change if the platform can provide consumers better product rankings
based on personal consumer preferences. I compare market outcomes in two different cases: in
the first case, the platform provides the personalized rankings of products to consumers based on
their personal preferences; in the second one, the platform provides the common ranking to all
consumers based on the aggregated data of all consumers preferences.
To address these questions, I utilize the dataset provided by Expedia.1. It includes consumers’
search and purchase data and information on the hotels observed by consumers after filling a
search query. I provide the equilibrium model to investigate market outcomes’ change under the
platform’s different ranking mechanisms. To analyze consumer demand, I construct the struc-
tural model of optimal consumer choice with the search frictions based on the classical Weitzman
(1979) model, where consumers conduct sequential search and on each step, after exploring the
hotel, make a decision whether to explore another one and if yes, then which hotel to explore
next. Conditional to this demand, I model hotels’ pricing game and use it to estimate hotels’ costs.
Last, using estimation results of demand and supply sides, I run simulations to evaluate the market
outcomes under the platform’s different ranking mechanisms.
This paper is the first attempt to estimate the equilibrium model in such a setting. Previous
empirical works do not model firms’ strategic pricing response on the change of platform’s ranking
mechanism and estimate only the welfare effects due to the change in consumers’ search and
purchase behavior. Part of the reason for that is computational difficulty in simulating the change
1The dataset was originally provided for the Kaggle competition Expedia provided the allowance to use the dataset
for academic purposes after the competition was finished.
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in firms’ pricing decisions due to the complicated nature of the demand correspondence accounting
for search frictions. I overcome this difficulty by applying findings of Choi, Dai, and Kim (2018)
and Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest (2018), which allows me to translate the pricing
game among the sellers into a familiar discrete-choice problem. The equilibrium model allows
me to estimate the change in market prices and get more accurate results. In contrast to previous
research, I show that personalized ranking is harmful to consumers despite the decrease in search
expenditures.
I find that under the personalized ranking, consumers experience on average .8% ($1.1) utility
gain due to a reduction in search intensity compared to the common ranking case since consumers
find better-suited products in higher positions. Besides, due to better ranking, consumers on av-
erage are able to find better-suited hotels, which increases their utility on average by 0.5% ($0.7).
On the other hand, consumer utility reduces on average by 3.6% ($4.9) due to increased prices in
the case of personalized ranking comparative to the common ranking case. The resulting effect
is summarized as an average loss of 2.3% ($3.1). Simultaneously, less price-sensitive consumers
might experience more than 11% ($15) utility gain, and more price-sensitive consumers lose more
than 15% ($20) of utility.
This study results might argue in the discussion of policy implementation regarding collecting
and using personal consumer data. In contrast to previous research, my results show that personal
data usage is harmful on average for consumers. Although they might help provide better service to
consumers, the market power shifts toward the supply side disproportionately, increasing market
prices by higher amounts than consumers’ gain. Simultaneously, consumer personal data usage
raises economic welfare by reducing search expenditures and helping consumers find better-suited
products. Hence, to forbid platforms from collecting and using personal consumer data might not
be optimal because it would reduce economic welfare. Direct money transfers to consumers for
the data they share with companies might be a better solution.
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1.1.1 Contribution to the Literature
Consumers often have to search among different products before deciding which one to pur-
chase. The search behavior might be influenced by the way the products are presented to con-
sumers. If one of the products is more prominent than others, consumers might find it optimal
to start the search from this product. For example, Meredith and Salant (2013) and Ho and Imai
(2006) find that candidate’s vote share increases if the they are listed first in the ballot.
This paper adds to the literature studying the effect of rankings on consumer search and pur-
chase decisions. Several recent papers estimate consumers’ demand parameters and search costs
using the demand model based on the classical Weitzman (1979) sequential search model. Con-
sumer search was firstly empirically analyzed by Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg (2010). Ad-
ditionally, Honka and Chintagunta (2017), Chen and Yao (2017) and Ursu (2018) extended their
analysis to model search and purchase joint decisions. Later, Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg
(2017) discusses the method of computational burden decrease by providing semi-closed-form ex-
pressions for the probability of choice in Weitzman (1979) search model, applying a probit model
of sequential search.
I contribute to this branch of the literature in two directions. First, I provide the approach to
translate consumer joint search and purchase decision to a standard discrete choice model, using
findings of Choi et al. (2018) and Moraga-González et al. (2018), which dramatically lowers the
computational complexity of estimation by providing closed-form choice probabilities. Second,
my paper is the first attempt to model the market’s supply side in such settings to the best of my
knowledge. I explicitly model the pricing game among sellers and analyze the price change under
different rankings. My results show that consumer-specific rankings are harmful to consumer
surplus, in contrast to all aforementioned papers.
The online sponsored-search studies are another branch of literature that discusses how the
ranking of alternatives affects consumer search and purchase behavior (e.g. Ghose and Yang
(2009), Athey and Ellison (2011), Agarwal, Hosanagar, and Smith (2011), Ghose, Ipeirotis, and
Li (2014), Jeziorski and Segal (2015)). These studies have found that advertisements in lower
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positions of the paid rankings consistently get lower click-through rates. This literature branch is
concentrated on the analysis of consumer click and purchase behavior and does not consider seller
pricing. This literature might also benefit from my study’s findings showing that better product
targeting might be harmful to consumer utility because it shifts market power toward the supply
side and leads to an increased price.
Furthermore, my results add empirical evidence to recently growing literature discussing the
effect of information on competition on markets with horizontally differentiated products. Elliott
and Galeotti (2019) show that an information designer can suppress competition by segmenting
the market. Jones and Tonetti (2019) in contrast show it is socially optimal when consumers,
rather than firms, own and trade their data. Other studies (Roy (2000), Iyer, Soberman, and Villas-
Boas (2005) and Gaelotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2008)) show that information allows firms to
target consumers and segment the market, which soften price competition. However, De Corniere
(2016) shows that, targeting leads to more intense competition when consumers actively search
for products. The literature mentioned above is solely theoretical, and this paper contributes to it
providing empirical evidence of information disclosure effect on firms competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 1.5 I provide the motivating example.
Section 1.6 introduces the empirical demand and supply model used in this study. The details of
the dataset are discussed in section 1.3. Section 1.7 provides the results of estimation. In section
1.8 I provide the main results – market simulations under different data allowance policies. Section
1.9 is a concluding remark.
1.2 The Online Travel Agent Industry Background
Here I provide the main details of the online travel agency industry that are relevant to this
article. In 2013 (the year relevant to the dataset used in this study), the American online travel
agency (OTA) booking market had a revenue of $157 billion, accounting for 80% of the total online
booking market. Expedia was the largest OTA on the market and combined with Booking.com,




OTAs provide consumers an ordered list of third-party sellers of hotel rooms. In order of
competition with rivals, each OTA tries to ensure a better consumer experience to their customers
and puts better-suited products higher in the lists shown to consumers. OTAs rank different hotel
rooms according to consumers’ preferences based on the room’s characteristics such as price,
hotel star rating, location, etc. Such a business model makes it impossible to sellers to affect their
positions in rankings directly.
This paragraph provides details on the process consumer follows booking a hotel room on Ex-
pedia. At first, the consumer fills the query on the Expedia site specifying trip details such as travel
dates, the room type, the location of the hotel, the desired room price, etc. Conditional on con-
sumer’s query, Expedia provides an ordered list of hotel rooms that match consumer’s preferences.
Consumer observes this ordered list and might click on any room to explore additional informa-
tion by navigating to a sub-page of the chosen room. After that consumer might either book this
room or come back to the previous page to explore another room or leave the Expedia site without
booking.
1.3 Data
The dataset used in this study was provided by Expedia for the Kaggle contest in 2013. The
dataset is organized as the set of search results presented to consumers in response to their queries.
Each consumer observes the set of hotel rooms matching his preferences according to the search
query specifications. In addition to hotels’ quality characteristics, prices, and positions in the rank-
ing of hotels in a set shown to each consumer, the dataset contains consumer purchase and search
behavior: there is explicitly observed which hotels consumers clicked on to get extra information
and which, if any, they booked.
The advantage of the data, allowing to study consumers’ search behavior, is that the dataset
includes not only purchases of consumers but also all clicks they make. The disadvantage is that
the dataset does not contain info on the additional information consumers observe after clicking
the hotel page. Unfortunately, the dataset does not provide unique IDs for consumers, hence, I can
not link different queries made by the same consumer. On the Expedia site, consumers can filter
the resulting list of hotels or apply the custom ranking according to price, quality, location, etc.
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However, the dataset contains only search queries ordered according to default Expedia algorithms.
One of the main advantages of the dataset is that besides search impressions from the default
Expedia algorithm, it contains search impressions where the hotels are randomly sorted, which
helps to study the effect of ranking on hotel attractiveness for the consumer.
The data summary statistics at the hotel and the query level are provided in Table 1.1. The
median hotel has three stars and a reviews score of 4 out of 5. On average the hotel room in those
hotels costs $156 per night. Most hotels are chain hotels and only 35% are independent hotels. The
desirability of a hotel’s location is represented by an Expedia location score ranging between 0 and
7, which primarily captures the distance of the hotel from downtown but also takes into account
amenities nearby. The score for an average hotel in the dataset is 3.09. In a query results, a median
consumer sees 31 hotel displayed on the page. The median consumer travels with no children and
looks for one hotel room for two adults for two days. The dataset contains 231,7181 clicks, where
72,813 clicks are conducted under the Random ranking. Each search query result includes at least
one click. There are approximately 7% of search queries results have two or more clicks. This
suggests for high consumer search costs. Around 66% of all consumers book a room after the
search. The total number of transactions in the data is 135,546 where only 4,891 are conducted
under the Random ranking. An average displayed hotel is $13 ($22) more expensive than clicked
(booked) ones and has a lower review ranking and a lower number of stars.
1.4 Reduced Form Evidence
This section presents reduced-form evidence of the hotel’s ranking effect on consumer search
and purchase behavior. To illustrate the main behavior patterns, I use the part of the dataset where
the hotels were shown to consumers in random order without accounting for their fit to consumers’
preferences. That allows omitting endogeneity bias in a general Expedia ranking since under a
general ranking, Expedia tries to put better hotels on the top of the list. Figure 1.1a depicts the
click-through as a function of the hotel’s position in the list, that is, the probability the hotels was
clicked and explored (searched) by a consumer conditional on it was shown to him. The data
suggest hotels in higher positions are explored more often, which suggests the ranking affects
consumers’ search behavior. Figure 1.1b shows there is no significant position of ranking on the
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Table 1.1: Hotel and Query Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Median SD Min Max
Hotel level
Price 5,511,851 156.49 129.00 101.28 10 1000
Stars 5,383,647 3.31 3.00 0.88 1 5
Review Score 5,505,786 3.86 4.00 0.91 0 5
Chain 5,511,851 0.65 1.00 0.48 0 1
Location Score 5,511,851 3.09 3.00 1.52 0 7
Promotion 5,511,851 0.24 0.00 0.43 0 1
Query level
Number of hotels displayed 206,657 27.12 31.00 8.10 5 38
Trip length (days) 206,657 2.42 2.00 1.98 1 40
Booking window (days) 206,657 39.26 18.00 53.89 0 498
Saturday night (percent) 206,657 0.50 1.00 0.50 0 1
Adults 206,657 2.00 2.00 0.90 1 9
Children 206,657 0.39 0.00 0.79 0 9
Rooms 206,657 1.12 1.00 0.44 1 8
Total clicks 206,657 1.12 1.00 0.61 1 25
Two or more clicks (percent) 206,657 0.07 0.00 0.25 0 1
Transaction 206,657 0.66 1.00 0.48 0 1
Random ranking (percent) 206,657 0.31 0.00 0.46 0 1
conversion rate, e.g., the probability the hotels were booked if explored. As a result, I conclude
that the hotel’s position on the screen does not change the valuation of the hotel by the consumer.
However, the position still affects the unconditional probability of purchase through the probabil-
ity that the hotel will be included in the consumer’s consideration set. So, ranking affects what
consumers search, but conditional on search, it does not affect purchases.
Click-through and conversion rates under the general Expedia’s ranking are provided in Fig-
ure 1.2a and Figure 1.2b respectively. It shows that under Expedia’s puts better-suited to consumer
preferences hotels on the top of the list, higher-ranked hotels get more clicks and bookings condi-
tional on a click, increasing the effect of ranking.
1.5 Motivating Example
In section 1.4, I discussed how the change in the hotels’ ranking leads to consumer behav-
ior change. If consumers change their search and purchase behavior, hotels also will adjust their
pricing strategies accordingly. As an illustration of the logic of the mechanism of how the rank-
ing affects prices, here I discuss a simple theoretical example. The example’s main objective is
8
Figure 1.1: Hotels’ Click Through and Conversion rates. Randomly sorted queries.
(a) Click Through Rate (b) Conversion Rate
Note: The click-through rate and the conversion rate (the purchase rate conditional on click)
over positions for the case when the lists of hotels, presented to consumers were formed randomly
without accounting to the utility provided by hotels.
to demonstrate the difference in prices firms charge when the platform can provide the personal
ranking to each consumer based on consumer’s preferences and when the platform has to provide
the common ranking to all consumers based on the aggregate preferences of these consumers.
The economy consist of two firms A and B, selling products a and b respectively, unit mass
of consumers and the platform. Each consumer has a unit demand and does not have any outside
option. The platform is the only place where the consumers can purchase the product. Consumers
do not observe the entire product matching quality and pay the search cost to explore it. Though,
prior to the search, consumers observe the part of the product’s matching quality and observe the
second part after the search. Consumers can not purchase the product without exploring it and
paying the search cost. The platform guides the consumers’ search process providing the ranking
of products and placing products with higher potential matching qualities on top positions in the
ranking. More detail about the platform’s role is provided below. Firms compete in prices and set
them optimally conditional on consumers’ behavior. Firms’ objective is to maximize profit. The
marginal costs of both products are normalized to zero.
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Figure 1.2: Hotels’ Click Through and Conversion rates. Queries sorted by Expedia ranking.
(a) Click Through Rate (b) Conversion Rate
Note: The click-through rate and the conversion rate (the purchase rate conditional on click) over
positions for the case when the lists of hotels, presented to consumers were formed according to
Expedia’s algorithm accounting to the utility provided by hotels.
If the consumer i purchases product j, his utility:
Uij = uij − pj = δij + εij − pj,
where δij and εij are parts of utility observed prior and after the search, respectively, and pj is
the price of product j. εij is assumed to be a random draw from the exponential distribution with
parameter 1 and be uncorrelated among consumers and firms.
Consumers are different in their valuations of products. εij is iid across consumers and prod-
ucts, though consumers value differently δij , the product’s part of utility observed prior to search.
Two-thirds of consumers (labeled Consumer 1) have preferences δia = δ, and δib = 0, while the
remaining one-third of consumers (labeled Consumer 2) have preferences δia = 0, and δib = δ.
Consumers’ product values are illustrated in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Consumers’ products values
Products Consumer 1 Consumer 2
a δ + εia 0 + εia
b 0 + εib δ + εib
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As mentioned above, the platform guides consumer’s search process by providing the ranking
of products and placing on higher positions products with higher potential matching qualities. Due
to εij are i.i.d among consumers and products, the platform attempts to place on the higher position
the product with higher δij . This exercise aims to compare market outcomes in two scenarios: first,
the platform can provide the personal ranking of products to each given consumer, and second, the
platform has to provide the same ranking to all consumers. In the first scenario, the platform will
place the product a in a higher position for two-thirds of consumers (Consumer 1) and product
b for the remaining one-third of consumers (Consumer 2). In the second scenario, the best the
platform can do is place product a higher for all consumers. The rankings under two scenarios are
represented in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Positions of products under common and personal rankings
Position
Common ranking Personal ranking
Consumer 1 Consumer 2 Consumer 1 Consumer 2
1 a a a b
2 b b b a
In accordance with the literature, I let the search cost differ over positions. Consumers pay zero
cost to explore εi of the product placed in the first position, while consumer i have to pay search
cost si to explore εi of the product placed in the second position. si is assumed to be a random
draw from the standard uniform distribution U [0, 1] and be uncorrelated among consumers.
Choi et al. (2018) shows that as a result of optimal search and purchase decisions, rational
consumer purchases the product with the highest wij − pj , where wij is defined in Equation 1.1.
wij = min{uij, rij}, (1.1)
where rij is the reservation utility of product j for consumer i, i.e. such utility level that the
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consumer i is indifferent between obtaining utility rij immediately and visiting seller j. The math-




(u− rij)dF (u) =
∞∫
rij−δij
(ε− rij)dF (ε) (1.2)
Due to the assumption that ε ∼ Exp(1), Equation 1.2 can be solved in closed-form and the
reservation utility can be decomposed into a utility observed prior to search component and a
search cost component:






As a result, the Equation 1.1 can be rewritten as








Due to εij are i.i.d. over consumers and products and sij depends only on the position of
the product in the ranking but not the identity of the product itself, the distribution of the second
additive part in the equation above depends only on the position of the product in the ranking. If






exponential distribution with parameter 1. If the product j is listed on the second position, then













follows an exponential distribution with parameter 2. The distribution
of w’s is summarized in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: The distribution of w’s under different rankings.
Position
Common ranking Personal ranking
Consumer 1 Consumer 2 Consumer 1 Consumer 2
1 a:w1a − δ ∼ Exp(1) a: w2a ∼ Exp(1) a:w1a − δ ∼ Exp(1) b:w2b − δ ∼ Exp(1)
2 b: w1b ∼ Exp(2) b:w2b − δ ∼ Exp(2) b: w1b ∼ Exp(2) a: w2a ∼ Exp(2)
As shown in Choi et al. (2018), each consumer purchases the product with a higher realization
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Pr(w1a + δ − pA > w1b − pB) +
1
3
Pr(w2a − pA > w2b + δ − pB)
DB(pA, pB) = 1−DA(pA, pB) (1.5)
Note that firms have different demand functions under the common and personal rankings due
to w2a, w2b have different distributions under the common and personal rankings. Each demand
function is the probability that one exponential variable with a given parameter is lower than an-
other exponential variable with another given parameter; hence it can be expressed as a probability
distribution function of a random variable that follows the Laplace distribution.
As Quint (2014) showed, due to the distribution of w’s is log-concave, there exists a unique
equilibrium, which is in pure strategies, in the pricing game among the sellers. Standard FOC
conditions determine the price equilibrium. In this setting, the FOC condition is a transcendental
equation and can not be solved in the closed form, so I provide numerical solution results on the
Figure 1.3.
As we see, depending on the value δ of the level of products horizontal differentiation, firms
might charge higher or lower prices in the case of personalized ranking comparative to the common
ranking case. This might be explained by the fact that the transition from the common ranking to
the personalized ranking involves two changes in the firm’s pricing incentives, summarized by the
following two effects. The first effect provides incentives to both firms to increase prices. In the
case of the personal ranking, compared to the common ranking case, consumers on average find a
well-suited product in the first position, which lowers their incentives to search further. This leads
to a decrease in the competition between firms, and as a result, both firms have an incentive to
increase prices regardless of their position in the common ranking. The second effect affects firms
pricing decisions heterogeneously depending on their ranking position in the common ranking.
As Armstrong (2017) shows, when prices are observed prior to the search, they can influence a
consumer’s search order. Firm A, shown on the first positions under the common ranking, has zero
search cost and does not need to keep prices low to attract consumers to explore its product. Under
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the personal ranking, firm A is shown on the second position for one-third of consumers, which
provides incentives to decrease the price. Firm B, shown in the second position under the common
ranking, needs to keep its prices low; otherwise, consumers will not explore its product due to
search costs. Under the personal ranking firm B is shown to one-third of consumers on the first
positions. As a result, it has a lower incentive to keep prices low under the personal ranking. As the
level of product horizontal differentiation increases, the advertising effect becomes less important
since consumers have stronger preferences toward one of the products. Hence as δ increases, firm
A has more incentives to increase the price. For firm B, both effects provide an incentive to increase
the price for any level of δ, but for very low δ, firm B in equilibrium decreases price in response to
a dramatic decrease in product A price.
Figure 1.3: Prices as functions of δ.
Note: Firms’ prices in the case of personalized ranking and common ranking for the market set-
tings, discussed in section 1.5.
The example’s main point is demonstrated on Figure 1.3, which highlights that the permuta-
tion of product positions in ranking alone is enough to change the market outcomes. Firms charge
different prices if the platform is allowed to rank products according to personal consumers’ pref-
erences rather than use the common ranking to all consumers. Besides, the difference in price
between two ranking mechanisms depends on the level of products’ differentiation.
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1.6 Empirical Model
1.6.1 Modeling of the Platform’s Information
This section explains how I model the information about consumers’ preferences that the plat-
form uses to rank products under different ranking paradigms: the common ranking, the personal
ranking, and the random ranking.
By analogy with the example from the previous section, the platform observes δ’s, the part
of utility observed by the consumer prior to the search. δ is a convolution of objective product
characteristics weighted on consumer’s sensitivity to them. More precisely, product j utility that
consumer i observes prior to search is
δij = αipj + β
′
ixj ,
where pj and xj are price and the vector of objective product’s characteristics observed prior to
exploring the product’s page. In the case of hotels, xj might contain such characteristics as hotel
star rating, review score, chain identity, location, snd, etc. αi andβi describe consumer’s sensitivity
to price and mentioned characteristics.
In general, two different consumers value differently the same objective properties of the prod-
uct. In the case of hotels, different consumers might, for example, have different favorite hotel
chains and have different sensitivity to the price of the hotel room. As a result, different consumers
have different αs and βs, labeled as αi and βi, showing their affiliation to consumer i. The set
of αi’s and βi’s of all consumers on the market form the distribution with means ᾱ and β̄ and
variances σα and Σβ.
By saying that the platform knows personal consumer preferences, I assume that the platform
knows some information about individual αis and βis. In the extreme case, the platform knows
the actual values of αi and βi for each given consumer. In a more realistic scenario, illustrated on
Figure 1.4, the platform knows in what part of a distribution bell αi and βi are positioned. Both
scenarios allow estimating δij for each given consumer, which is different from the mean among
populational δj .
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If the platform is allowed to use the information about consumer’s personal preferences to
form rankings, the platform can rank the products to each given consumer i, placing products with
higher δij’s on higher positions, what, as we saw in the previous section, leads to market prices
change. If the platform, on the contrary, is not allowed to use the information on the personal
preferences, then it has to use only information on aggregated preferences, ᾱ and β̄, which lead to
identical ranking to all consumers.
Figure 1.4: Example of the platform’s information
1.6.2 Demand Side
The response to each consumer’s query contains J different hotels (indexed by j = 0, 1, 2, . . . J ,
where 0 stand for the outside option). The utility consumer i derives from hotel j is given by:
uij = αipj + β
′
ixj + ξj + εij, (1.6)
where the variable pj stands for the price of hotel j and the vector (xj , ξj, εij) describes differ-
ent hotel attributes that consumer values. αi and β′i denote consumer-specific price coefficient and
a vector of tastes parameters. As usual, xj includes a 1 to allow for a constant term in the utility
function. I assume that the consumer observes the hotel attributes contained in xj without search-
ing. The variable εij measures the match between consumer i and hotel j and is independently and
identically distributed across consumers and hotels. Each εij is a draw from Gumbel distribution
with location and scale parameters 0 and 1 (Type I Extreme Value), as is common in choice models.
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I assume that εij captures hotel’s characteristics that can be observed only after exploring the hotel
page. I assume that the econometrician observes the hotel characteristics xj but does not observe
characteristics ξj and matching value εij . The variables ξj are often interpreted as unobserved by
econometrician quality, and, since quality is likely to be correlated with the price of a hotel, this
will lead to the usual price endogeneity problem, which I treat with the standard control function
approach (Train (2009)). The price and the quality characteristics x0, ξ0 of the outside option are
assumed to be equal to zero.
It is important to note that the consumer’s purchase decision and actual consumption happen
not at the same time moment. Consumers book a hotel room in advance and visit the hotel after
some time. As described in section 1.3, the median time between booking and staying in the hotel
(booking window) is 18 days in the observed dataset. Consumers make decisions on what hotels to
book, conditional on prices and availability of hotels presented at the booking date. Unfortunately,
the dataset does not contain any sort of consumers’ IDs and does not allow tracking consumers’
decisions in time, making it impossible to introduce any dynamics in modeling consumers’ deci-
sions. If a consumer does not book any hotel after conducting a search, I assume the consumer
leaves the market with an outside option and does not return to the platform in the future.
Consumers differ in their value of hotel characteristics. Parameters αi and βi differ across
consumers in order to capture consumer heterogeneity in tastes. These parameters are assumed to












where Σβ is a diagonal matrix, i.e., I assume that consumer demand elasticities are independent.
Following the mainstream consumer search literature, I assume consumers do not initially
know the exact utility they derive by booking each of the available hotels and incur a search cost
to learn them. To be more specific, I assume that before searching a consumer i knows (i) hotel
characteristics pj and xj for each hotel j, (ii) the distribution F (ε) of match values εij , including
17
the outside option εi0. Consumer i searches by visiting j hotel’s page and learning the value of the
matching parameter εij incurring the search cost associated with this hotel.
Consumers search sequentially with costless recall, i.e., they determine after each visit to a
hotel’s page whether to book any of the inspected hotels so far, continue searching, or opt-out for
the outside option. The outside options’ price and characteristics are normalized to zero; hence,
the outside option ui0 equals εi0 and follows Type I Extreme Value distribution. Let snij denote the
search cost of consumer i for visiting page of the hotel j, where nij is the position of the hotel j
in the list of hotels shown to the consumer i by the platform. In section 1.6.2.2 I discuss why the
cost of exploring the hotels depends on its position in the rank rather than the hotel’s identity. The
search cost associated with the outside option is assumed to be zero. As a result, each consumer
knows the value of his outside option ui0 = εi0 without paying any search cost.
1.6.2.1 Optimal Consumer Sequential Search
The utility function in Equation 1.6 can be rewritten as
uij = δij + εij, (1.8)
where δij is the mean utility consumer i derives from hotel j and εij is TIEV random shock. As
explained above, the consumer knows δij but has to search to discover εij . The match values εij
follow TIEV distribution, which is the same for all consumers and hotels, and is given by F (ε)
with pdf f(ε).
Since I allow for consumer-specific taste parameters, the distribution of consumer is utility uij
from a given hotel j differs across consumers. This leads to the usual aggregation problem I need
to deal with. Since the utility shock εij is an iid draw from TIEV distribution, the utility distribution
for hotel j faced by consumer i is
Fij(u) = F (u− δij), (1.9)
that is, the distribution of uij is Gumbel distribution with a location parameter δij and scale 1.
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Following Weitzman (1979), I define Hij(r), the expected gains to consumer i from exploring





If consumer i’s expected gains are higher than the cost snij he has to incur to explore the hotel
j, it’s optimal for him to explore the hotel j. Correspondingly, I define the reservation value rij as
the solution to the equation
Hij(rij) = snij (1.11)





Note that rij is a scalar and that for each consumer i, there is one such scalar for every hotel j.
Moraga-González et al. (2018) shows that the reservation value can be decomposed into a mean
utility component and a search cost component:















where in the last equation, the fact that εij is TIEV random variable is used. γ here is the Euler
constant. The outside option’s reservation utility equals positive infinity since the cost of exploring
the outside option is normalized to zero.
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Weitzman (1979) demonstrates that the optimal search strategy for a consumer i consists of
visiting sellers in descending order of reservation values rij and stopping search as soon as the best
option encountered so far (which includes the outside option) gives a higher utility than the reser-
vation value of the next option to be searched. This optimal search strategy can be characterized
by the following search rules:
1. Selection rule. If a hotel is to be explored, it should be that hotel with the highest reservation
utility.
2. Stopping rule. Terminate search whenever the maximum utility observed (including the
outside option) exceeds the reservation utility of every unsearched option, i.e.
2.1 If the consumer explores a hotel, his reservation utility from that hotel exceeds his
utility from all already searched hotels, including outside option.
2.2 The maximum utility among all searched hotels is higher than the utilities of all un-
searched ones.
3. Choice rule. Once the search is terminated, the consumer will choose the hotel with the
highest utility among those searched, including the outside option.
The rules 2.2 and 3 rely only on the information what hotels consumer explored and which one
finally booked, while rules 1 and 2.1 requires the data of the order in which consumers explores
alternatives. Expedia’s dataset does not include information on the order in which the consumer
visits hotels’ pages. Jeziorski and Segal (2015) showed that users click ads in a nonsequential or-
der which makes it unreasonable to assume any given order of search (e.g., assume that consumers
search in the order of ranking positions). Given that some consumers explore up to 25 hotels, the
number of possible search orders for these consumers is 25! ≈ 1025, which makes it computation-
ally impossible to model the search order. To address this challenge, I adapt recent findings from
the theoretical search literature by Armstrong (2017) and Choi et al. (2018) and its application
by Moraga-González et al. (2018) that make it possible to compute the buying probability of a
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given alternative without having to go explicitly through the myriad of possible ways in which a
consumer may end up considering the alternative in question.
1.6.2.2 The Effect of Ranking
As discussed in section 1.3, Expedia’s dataset contains impressions where the hotels were
sorted randomly, which allows separating the effect of hotels’ positioning on the consumer behav-
ior from the effect of hotels’ attractiveness. The right panel of Figure 1.1 shows that the conver-
sion rate does not depend on the position itself, which is an argument that the position the hotel
is presented does not affect consumers’ utility. The left panel shows that the Click-through rate is
decreasing over positions, which is an argument that the hotel’s position affects consumer’s search
behavior.
Given consumer’s optimal search strategy, described in section 1.6.2.1, the effect of the rank-
ing on consumers’ choice can be rationalized only in one of the following situations. The ranking
affects either consumers’ search behavior by affecting reservation utilities rij associated with the
hotels, or it affects consumers’ purchasing behavior through affecting the actual utilities uij con-
sumers derive from booking the hotels. According to Equation 1.8 and Equation 1.13, there are
three potential ways how the ranking can affect the reservation or actual utilities – by affecting the
utility prior to search (δij), the portion of utility realized after the search (εij), and the search cost
(snij ).
Ursu (2018) showed using the dataset discussing in this study, that the rank of a hotel in the list
provided to consumer’s query has the effect only on the search cost associated with the hotel and
does not have any effects on δij and εij . Therefore, the ranking affects the reservation utility and,
in turn, the optimal searching and purchasing decisions only through an effect on the displayed
hotel’s search cost, which is the model used in this paper. Ursu’s arguments are mainly based on
the observation that the probability the consumer books the hotel, conditional on exploring it, does
not depend on the hotel’s position, as shown on Figure 1.1b. She concludes that the hotel’s position
in the rank does not affect how the consumer values the hotel and only affects the probability the
hotel appears in his consideration set.
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1.6.2.3 Probabilities of Purchase
For each consumer i and hotel j define a random variable wij , effective utility, as a minimum
of the utility uij and the reservation utility rij .
wij
def
= min{uij, rij} = δij + min{εij, H−10 (snij)}. (1.15)
Choi et al. (2018) showed that if the consumer conducts a sequential search, he purchases product
i with the highest value of wij among all products. This result’s intuition is as follows: If the
reservation utility rij is too low, the product is never even explored by a consumer. If the actual
utility uij is too low, the consumer will not purchase the product even if examined. As a result,
consumer decision depends on the minimum of these two.
According to that, a consumer’s purchase decision can be described as in the discrete-choice
model. However the consumer decision is based on newly introduced effective utilities wij , rather
than utilities uij or reservation utilities rij . Obviously, wij is related to utilities uij . As snij ap-
proaches to 0, wij tends to uij since H−10 (snij) converges to ∞). Intuitively, consumers make a
fully informed decision if there are no search costs associated with exploring products and gath-
ering the information (i.e., wij = uij ∀i). Hence consumer purchases the best product among all
alternatives. If the search cost associated with only the product j becomes relatively high, keep-
ing all other search costs neglectable, making the product j less attractable to explore and hence
decreases its chances to be purchased. According to Equation 1.15, H−10 (snij) associated with the
product j decreases leading to decrease of wij and rij . Hence εij becomes less important since the
consumer is less likely to explore this product at all. If search costs of all products uniformly grow
arbitrarily large, then consumers make a purchase decisions based only on values δij observed prior
to search since consumer either explore the product with the highest δij and find it not profitable to
incur the search cost to explore the next one, or do not search at all and leave the market with the
outside option.
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Accordingly, the probability that buyer i books hotel j can be expressed as:








The distribution of wij = min{uij, rij} can be obtained by computing the CDF of the minimum of
two independent random variables. This means that
Fwij (x) = 1− (1− F rij(x))(1− Fij(x)) (1.17)
where Fwij and F
r
ij are the CDFs of wij and rij , respectively. Recall that Fij(x) is the CDF of uij ,
which has been specified above in Equation 1.9.
To obtain the reservation values distribution, I use Equation 1.12.
F rij(x) = Pr(rij < x) = Pr(Hij(rij) > Hij(x)) = Pr(sij > Hij(x)) = 1− F sij(Hij(x))
Substituting this into Equation 1.17 gives
Fwij (x) = 1− F sij(Hij(x))(1− Fij(x)) (1.18)
Equation 1.18 provides a relationship between the search cost distribution and the distribution
of the ws. Assuming the right search costs distribution, any needed distribution of ws can be
obtained. Moraga-González et al. (2018) shows that if
F sij =
1− exp(−exp(−H−10 (s)− µij))
1− exp(−exp(−H−10 (s)))
, (1.19)
where µij is a consumer-hotel specific parameter of the search cost distribution, then CDF of wij
is given by Gumbel distribution:
Fwij (x) = exp(−exp(−(x− (δij − µij)))) (1.20)
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where 1 in denominator is due to for the outside option wi0 = min{ui0, ri0} = ui0 = εi0, since the
search cost for outside option equals zero and hence ri0 = ∞. As a result the effective utility of
the outside option wi0 follows TIEV distribution.
Finally, the unconditional choice probability can be obtained from Pij in Equation 1.21 by
integrating out the consumer-specific variables. Denoting by θi the vector of all consumer-specific












As discussed in Section 1.6.2.2, consumer-hotel specific parameter of the search cost distribu-
tion µij depends not on the identity of the hotel, but its position in the ranking. I model µij as
µij = log(1 + e
γ·nij), where nij is the position of the hotel j in ranking shown to the consumer i.
1.6.3 Supply Side
At the moment t′ each hotel j sets the price pjtt′ for a given hotel room at a given night t to
maximize the expected profit of such sale, conditional on the prices and characteristics of rivals
and the opportunity cost cjtt′ and the hotel-specific ad-valorem fee fj charged by the platform. As
discussed at subsection 1.6.2, consumer consumption and purchase decision are spaced in time.
At the moment t′ consumer books a hotel room to stay in at the moment t. The median booking
window in the dataset equals 18 days.
This aspect makes the hotel’s pricing decision dynamic. By selling the room today, the hotel
loses the opportunity to sell this room tomorrow to another consumer for a potentially different
price. While I do not model it explicitly, the hotel’s dynamic price decision is captured by the
opportunity cost. It is important to note the fundamental difference between the opportunity cost
and the marginal cost. Opportunity cost represents the cost of selling the room at the moment the
24
query was submitted, which in addition to the marginal cost for room serving, includes the cost of
not having this room available in the future.
The hotel j profit is:
Πjtt′ =
(
(1− fj)pjtt′ − cjtt′
)
Djtt′(pjtt′) (1.23)
The expected demand of hotel j can be expressed as
Djtt′(pjtt′) =
∫
P (buy|θ)(pjtt′)dF θ(θ) (1.24)
where P (buy|θ)(pjtt′) is a probability that consumer with demand parameter θ purchases the prod-
uct of the firm j. This probability depends on the position of the hotel in the hotel ranking shown




P (buy|θ, position)(pjtt′) · 1(position|θ)(pjtt′)
)
dF θ(θ), (1.25)
where 1(position|θ)(pjtt′) is an indicator function of the hotel j be shown on the position position
in i′s consumer ranking and can be expressed as:
1(position)(pjtt′) =

1 if δj = δ(position)
0 if δj 6= δ(position)
where δ(position) is a position order statistic of δs, shown to the consumer i.e. position largest δ
among δs of hotels in the query response.
Choi et al. (2018) shows that as a result of optimal search and purchase decisions, rational
consumer purchases the product with the highest wij − pj , where wij is defined in Equation 1.1.
25
Hence P (buy|θ, position)(pjtt′) in Equation 1.31 can be expressed as






δij + min(εij, H
−1
0 (snj)) ≥ max
k∈Ji
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Since the platform tends to put better-fitted hotels in higher positions, the probability that the
hotel j is shown on the given position depends on the utility the consumer i derives from booking
this hotel. As a result, if the hotel increases room price, there are two effects on its demand. First,
it decreases the hotel’s chances to be shown in a high position, and second, for any position, it


























It is essential to discuss how the price the hotel charges affects its demand. There are two
effects. First, the price affects whether the hotel will be included in the consumer’s consideration
set. Since the platform wants to put on the higher positions hotels that provide higher utility
to consumers, the price increase moves the hotel down the list, increasing the cost of exploring
this hotel and reducing the reservation utility. In addition to that, the reservation utility explicitly
depends on price through the part of utility observed prior to the search. Moreover, the price also
affects purchase probability conditional on the consideration set since it affects the utility level
u that the consumer derives booking the hotel’s room. To summarize, price changes the hotel’s
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demand by affecting the hotel’s probability of appearing in the consumer’s consideration set and




The probability that a random consumer purchase the product of firm j was provided in section
1.6.2.3 in Equation 1.22 as Pj(θ), where θ = (α, σα,β,Σβ, γ) is a set of population distribution
parameters.







where dij = 1 if the consumer i books the hotel j and zero otherwise. There is no closed-form solu-
tion for the integral in Equation 1.22. Hence, I replace Pj(θ) with the simulated choice probability







To simulate P̃j(θ) I draw many values of θ, plug them into Pij and average over the resulting
logit probabilities. Both the numbers of observations and simulations must go to infinity to guar-
antee that the maximum simulated likelihood estimate of θ̂ be a consistent estimator of true pa-
rameter θ. However, Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993) show that for polychotomous choice
problems, MSL provides accurate parameter estimates, even with a small number of simulations. I
use 10,000 simulations, and that is considered sufficiently more than small for this type of problem.
1.7.1.2 Identification
In this section I discuss how the model parameters θ = (α, σα,β,Σβ, γ) can be recovered
using the variation in consumer behavior observed in the dataset. The model’s parameters include
the mean and variation of consumers’ utility parameters and position effect on the search cost.
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Consumer tastes for hotel characteristics are identified from consumers’ choice conditional on the
consideration set. If the consumer clicked on several hotels and booked one of them (or none),
this hotel (or outside option) provides a higher utility to the consumer. Different lists of hotels are
presented to different consumers which provides variation sufficient for identification consumers’
heterogeneous tastes. The consumer’s search behavior is also useful for identifying utility pa-
rameters because consumers explore only hotels with high enough utility observed before search.
Disparities in the search and booking frequencies are used to identify the position effect on the
search cost. If the hotel is explored frequently but rarely purchased after exploration, it has low
search cost and provides low utility. On the contrary, the hotel, which rarely explored but often
purchased after exploration, has high search cost and provides high utility.
1.7.1.3 Monte Carlo Simulations
This section describes simulation results to show that the estimation strategy described in sub-
subsection 1.6.2.3 works well to recover consumers’ taste and search cost parameters. For simu-
lation purposes, I generate a dataset of 1,000 consumers, each searching among 30 hotels. Hotel
characteristics (Quality and Price) are assumed to be drawn from a multivariate log-normal distri-
bution. Table 1.5 presents the result of Monte Carlo simulations. The true parameters are given
in the first column, and the estimation results are in the second one. Based on the results, we can
conclude that provided estimation method is effective in recovering true demand parameters. In
the next section, I apply the method to real data provided by Expedia to estimate the utility and
search parameters of consumers who participated in the hotel search and booking.
1.7.1.4 Empirical Results
I apply the estimation strategy, derived in section 1.6.2.3 to estimate consumer’s demand, using
the data provided by Expedia. Table 1.6 provides the results of the estimation.
The data shows evidence that the position effect on the search cost is positive and significant. It
provides an essential effect on consumers’ search and, hence, purchase decisions since hotels that
appear higher in the ranking have better chances to be explored and booked.
Consumers demonstrate considerable heterogeneity in their hotel attributes’ sensitivities, espe-
cially in the hotel location and chain affiliation. Therefore, using the personalized ranking might
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Table 1.5: Monte Carlo Simulation Results








Quality heterogeneity 0.6 0.5335∗
(0.0542)
Search cost
Position effect 0.1 0.0856∗
(0.0065)
Note: Stars indicate estimates significant at the 99% level.
have a big impact on consumers’ search and utility. I will further explore the effect of heterogeneity
on the market structure in the policy simulation section.





Price ($100) −2.4881∗∗∗ 0.6499∗∗∗
(0.1203) (0.1259)
Star rating 1.2369∗∗∗ 0.0166
(0.0705) (0.1703)
Review score 0.1118 0.0916
(0.0895) (0.171)
Location score 0.0737 0.9509∗∗∗
(0.1006) (0.0726)









The point of interest is hotels’ opportunity costs cjtt′ , which vary among hotels and queries,
and hotel-specific fees fj charged by the platform and vary among hotels only. For the simulation
purpose, it is not necessary to estimate both the cost and fees, but only the ratio cjtt′
1−fj because, as
described in Equation 1.28, hotels set prices conditional on this ratio.
Under the existing Expedia algorithm, the hotel’s position does not depend on the consumer’s










Using the consumers demand characteristics estimates from section 1.7.1.4, Equation 1.26 can
be expressed as a function of hotel’s j price pj . Under the assumption that the hotel knows on what
position it will be shown conditionally on price, the demand, described in Equation 1.31 can be
expressed as a function of the hotel’s j price.
Finally, the first order condition, provided in Equation 1.28 can be used to estimate the param-
eter cjtt′
1−fj . These parameters are used later in section Counterfactual Simulations to run simulations
for different data allowance policies.
1.7.2.2 Empirical Results
The estimation strategy described in the previous chapter allows recovering hotels’ opportunity
costs. The histogram of hotels’ opportunity costs is represented on Figure 1.5. I use this estimation
in the next section to get counterfactuals results and estimate the change in hotel pricing under the
personal and common rankings.
It is important to note that around 9% of the opportunity cost in the data is negative. As
discussed in Supply Side, the opportunity cost captures the dynamic nature of the hotel’s pricing
problem and represents the cost of selling the room when the query was submitted. If the hotel
expects that in the future, the equilibrium price on the market is going to decrease, for example,
because of an increase in competition, the opportunity cost of selling the room right now might
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be negative. Also, selling the room for a low price, the hotel might expect the consumer to write
a positive review, which increases the future hotel’s competitiveness and might be considered an
investment.





Note: Estimated distribution of hotels’ opportunity costs. Opportunity cost is negative for 9% of
rooms.
1.8 Counterfactual Simulations
In this section, I discuss the details of counterfactual simulations. Using the demand and firms’
opportunity costs estimations, provided in sections 1.7.1.4 and 1.7.2.2 respectively, I simulate
firms’ pricing decisions under two different data usage policies and compare results. In the first
one, I allow the platform to use consumers’ personal data to provide the personal ranking to each
consumer. In the second one, the platform is allowed to use only aggregated data of all consumers
and provide the same ranking to all consumers. In the first case, consumers find better-suited ho-
tels in higher positions, affecting consumers’ search behavior and, thus, hotels’ demand function.
This leads to different optimal prices under different raking mechanisms. Figure 1.6 shows the
histogram of the change in price each firm charges under the personal and common rankings.
In the case of the personal ranking, compared to the common ranking case, consumers find
better-suited hotels in higher positions, which lowers their incentives to search and decreases the
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Figure 1.6: Percentage Price Change. Personal vs Common rankings
Note: The histogram of the percentage price change with switching from the common ranking to
the personalized one.
average number of searched hotels. This effect leads to a decrease in the competition between ho-
tels, and as a result, all hotels have an incentive to increase the price regardless of their position in
the common ranking. The second effect affects hotels’ pricing decisions heterogeneously depend-
ing on their ranking position in the common ranking. As (Armstrong 2017) shows, if prices are
observed prior to search they can be used to influence a consumer’s search order. The hotels shown
on high positions under the common ranking have low search costs and do not need to keep prices
low to attract consumers to explore them. Under the personal ranking, these hotels are shown in
lower positions for some consumers, which provides incentives to decrease the price. The hotels
shown in low positions under the common ranking need to keep their prices low. Otherwise, con-
sumers will not explore them due to their high search costs. Under the personal ranking, these
hotels are good-suited for some consumers and shown to them in the high positions. As a result,
these hotels have a lower incentive to keep prices low under the personal ranking.
Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8 illustrate the heterogeneity of the sum of two effects over the positions
of hotels in the common ranking. Figures show that hotels in higher positions in the common
ranking have higher incentives to decrease prices.
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Figure 1.7: Percentage Price Change by position in the common ranking
Note: The histogram of the percentage price change by position in the common ranking. Switching
from the common ranking to the personalized one.
Figure 1.8: Positions of the hotels which increase and decrease prices respectively if the platform
applies the personal ranking
(a) Positions of hotels which charges lower prices
under the personal ranking
(b) Positions of hotels which charges higher prices
under the personal ranking
As discussed previously, all hotels have incentives to charge higher prices under the personal
ranking due to consumers find better-fitted hotels in higher positions and explore fewer hotels,
which lowers the competition between hotels. This effect increases with the level of hotel hori-
zontal differentiation. Figure 1.9 shows that if the consumer observes a higher variation of hotel
utilities in the query, the first effect has a bigger magnitude and the hotels have higher incentives
to increase the price.
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Figure 1.9: Price change. Personal vs Common rankings
(a) Position #1 (b) Position #15
Note: The percentage price change by the measure of the horizontal differentiation of the hotels in
query. Switching from the common ranking to the personalized one.
The change of the ranking mechanism has two effects on consumer utility. In addition to the
price change discussed above, the consumer finds better-suited hotels in higher positions, which
leads to a reduction in search expenditures. The first effect is summarized on Figure 1.10. On
average, due to the price increase, consumers lose $4, or 3% of their utility if the platform applies
the personal ranking, comparative to the common one. More sensitive to price, consumers lose
more, and less sensitive ones lose less utility as illustrated on Figure 1.10b.
The second effect is represented on Figure 1.11, which shows that the booked hotels’ average
position decreases under the personal ranking. On average, consumers save $1 of search expendi-
tures if the platform applies the personal ranking, compared to the common one.
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Figure 1.10: Consumers’ utility. Personal vs Common rankings
(a) Consumers utility distribution.
Personal vs Common rankings
(b) Distribution of utilities difference.
Personal vs Common rankings
Note: The left panel provides distributions of consumers’ utilities under two rankings. The right
panel provides the distribution of the difference in consumers’ utility under two rankings.
Figure 1.11: Positions of booked hotels. Personal vs Common rankings
Note: The figure provides the histogram of positions of the hotels booked by consumers under
personalized and common rankings.
1.9 Concluding Remark
This paper studies the influence of the consumers’ personal information, aka big data, on mar-
kets. Consumers are often uninformed about the quality of the products available on the market
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and have to conduct a costly search to learn it. In many markets, consumers search costly among
alternative options before making a purchase. The way to present products to consumers impacts
their search and purchase behavior and hence the market outcomes.
This paper contributes to the literature studying the change in firms’ competition due to a
change in consumer behavior caused by a change in platforms’ ranking mechanisms. To discover
empirical results, I use a rich dataset, which contains consumers’ search and purchase decisions.
In contrast to previous research, my results show that personal data usage is harmful on average
for consumers. Although data usage might help provide better service to consumers by reducing
search expenditures and procuring a better product match, the market power shifts toward the
supply side disproportionately, increasing market prices by higher amounts than consumers’ gain.
The fact that the platform uses consumer’s personal preference data to provide him a better
products ranking allows a consumer to spend less effort to find a suitable product and save on
average .8% of utility ($1.1) by the reduction of search expenditures and increase utility by .5%
($0.7) by booking a better hotel. However, the reduction of search intensity reduces the competition
between firms, providing them incentives to raise prices. As a result, consumers lose 3.6% of
utility ($4.9) on average due to the price increase. The resulting effect is negative in contrast to all
previous empirical studies, which did not account for transaction price change due to the change
of hotels’ competition.
Methodologically, this study contributes to the literature by providing a computational method
of analyzing firms’ pricing game in case of the demand function formed by consumers who search
costly among alternatives and form their consideration sets endogenously. To my knowledge, this
was computationally impossible before applying in this paper modern theoretical findings.
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CHAPTER 2
MARKETS WITH SEARCH FRICTIONS AND PARTIALLY INFORMED INTERMEDIARY
2.1 Introduction
Consumers are often uninformed about the quality of products available. They may conduct a
search to learn about the quality of products, and in many cases, these searches are facilitated by
information intermediaries. For example, real estate agents offer information on houses available
on the market, ski rental workers might help pick the proper gear, and online platforms give con-
sumers a ranking of sellers. Nowadays, in the Internet era, consumers conduct much lower search
costs and have access to a much wider set of products to choose from. Therefore, consumers as
never before are dependent on platforms steering their search for products that provide a ranking of
products. This has brought huge commercial success to Internet platforms such as Google, Ama-
zon, and Expedia. In such circumstances, the importance of understanding how intermediaries
influence the market increases.
This paper analyzes how the information a platform has about consumer preferences changes
market outcomes. There are two main features of the model: first, with some probability, the plat-
form observes the preferences of each consumer individually, and second, it offers each consumer
an individual list of firms to visit in some deliberate order. The key variable in the analysis is the
probability that the platform knows the quality of various products offered to each consumer. In
the special case, where this probability is one, the platform always recommends that the consumer
visit the firm with the highest quality products first. The main focus of this paper is a more gen-
eral case, where this probability is not one. As the probability increases (the platform gets better
information about consumer preferences), there are two countervailing forces. The direct effect
is that the platform recommends a greater mass of consumers to visit the firm with the highest
quality products first, which increases the mean quality of products purchased by consumers. The
indirect effect is that consumers expect the next products to be of lower quality, which reduces
their incentives to search further and leads to a decrease in the quality of products purchased by
those consumers whose preferences the platform does not know.
I demonstrate that in the case of a low search cost, better information leads to a decline in the
quality of purchased products, the consumer, and the total economic welfare. However, in the case
of a high search cost, the result is the opposite, and better information improves the mean quality
of purchased products and welfare.
2.1.1 Related Literature
The paper is related to the ordered search literature. Arbatskaya (2007) started this branch with
a discussion of homogeneous goods. Later Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2011)
investigate ordered search for heterogenous products, in the framework of Wolinsky (1986) and
Anderson and Renault (1999). See also recent publications by Parakhonyak and Titova (2018) and
Ding and Zhang (2018). In the aforementioned papers, the search ordered is either exogenous or
identical for all consumers. A high position in the search order captures the high prominence of a
firm. The current paper contributes to the literature by allowing the search order to be consumer-
specific (i.e. based on consumer taste). It better captures the business feature in the age of the
Internet. Search engines and intermediaries often use big data to make an individual recommenda-
tion based on consumers browsing and search history.
Armstrong (2017), Haan, Moraga-González, and Petrikaitė (2018) and Choi et al. (2018) also
study models with endogenous ordered search. Prior to search, a consumer receives information
about the match quality of the products being sold by every firm. In particular, Choi et al. (2018)
show that better information leads to a higher equilibrium price, which is consistent with the finding
in my model. However, my paper adds to the literature by showing the effect of the information on
the match quality and welfare, demonstrating in particular that the quality of a product purchased
by a consumer might be hurt by better information.
The paper is also related to the literature on information intermediaries, which is started by
Biglaiser (1993) and Lizzeri (1999). I contribute to their research by introducing heterogeneous
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products and ordered search settings. A wealth of literature discusses the intermediary as a market-
place that sets fees for firms and ranks them by those fees, but the marketplace itself does not have
any information about the quality of their products. Bright representatives of this approach are
Athey and Ellison (2011), Chen and He (2011) and Teh and Wright (2018). In these models, firms
are sorted by the fees paid, which, in equilibria, is determined by the firms’ heterogeneous qual-
ity, known by the firms only, and only in the latter paper, the order of firms is consumer-specific.
As a result, consumers explore products in a given order, determined by the platform’s ranking
mechanism. I contribute to this branch of literature by discussing the case of a strategic partially
informed platform, which autonomously determines the order of search based on incomplete in-
formation about consumer preferences.
There is literature on the relation between information and pricing. See Lewis and Sappington
(1994), Anderson and Renault (2006) and Anderson and Renault (2000). Recently, Roesler and
Szentes (2017) have used the newly developed information design technique a la Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011) and Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) to further explore this topic. The main mes-
sage is that more information can be bad because the monopolist can better price discrimination
against the consumer. See Boleslavsky, Hwang, and Kim (2018) and Armstrong and Zhou (2019)
for the effect of information in the competition model, and Dogan and Hu (2018) in a context of
consumer search. I contribute to this literature by showing another channel through which more
information can hurt the welfare. Richer information helps the platform make a better recommen-
dation to consumers, reducing consumers incentives to search. As a result, the set of products
considered by consumers shrinks, which might lead to a lower quality of purchased products.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2.2, I introduce the model. Later, in
section 2.3, I solve the model and analyze the equilibrium. In section 2.4, I derive the main results
– the effects of the platform having better information on the market, especially on the quality of
consumed products, the consumer, and the total welfares. section 2.5 is a concluding remark.
2.2 The Model
The economy consists of a monopolistic platform, two firms labeled A and B, and a continuum
of consumers with a measure of one. The platform is the only place for firms and consumers
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to meet. Firms produce horizontally differentiated products incurring a constant marginal cost
normalized to zero. The platform steers consumers’ search process by providing each consumer
an individual order to visit firms, based on the consumers’ preferences to firms’ products. For each
consumer the platform observes his preferences with probability q. With probability 1 − q, the
platform does not observe consumer preferences and has to rank products randomly. Consumers
do not know whether the platform observes their preferences, but know q. The platform charges
firms an ad valorem fee proportional to the transaction price. Firms maximize their revenues by
setting the price conditional on the platform’s ranking mechanism.
As in Wolinsky (1986), a consumer must incur a search cost s to learn the price charged by
any particular firm and its product quality. Consumers search sequentially with costless recall. If
consumer j buys a product of firm i at price pi after visiting k firms, he obtains utility
Uj,i = uj,i − k · s = εj,i − pi − k · s
where εj,i is the realization of a random variable with twice differentiable cdf F (ε), pdf f(ε) and
support [ε, ε̄]. The term εi,j can be interpreted as the product quality of firm i for consumer j, and
is assumed to be independent across consumers and firms. Each consumer can buy one unit of a
product at most. The consumer’s outside option is low enough to encourage him to purchase the
product at any price, which leads to full market coverage.
The market interaction proceeds as follows. All participants know q, the probability that the
platform observes the quality εj,A and εj,B for a given consumer j. First, firms simultaneously set
prices pA and pB, conditional on q. After that the platform provides an individual search order for
each consumer as follows: if the platform observes the quality of products for a given consumer,
it recommends this consumer to visit the firm with a higher quality first; if the platform does
not observe the quality, it makes the recommendation at random with equal probabilities. In the
equilibrium constructed later, it is optimal for a revenue-maximizing platform to offer consumers
such a search order, and for utility optimizing consumers to follow this recommendation. After
that, consumers form their expectations about prices and follow the ordered sequential search
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process with search cost s and costless recall. Thereafter, the consumer buys a utility-maximizing
product of the ones he explored and pays the price.
2.3 Analysis
In this section, I derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium by means of backward induction.
Because of consumers and firms’ ex-ante symmetry, I focus on analyzing symmetric equilibrium
when firms charge equal prices and get equal demand. First, I derive the consumer optimal search
rule and use it to obtain the demand functions and optimal pricing on the market. Thereafter, I
show that the price and the revenue of each firm increase with better information (higher q). This
verifies that, for a revenue-maximizing platform charging firms an ad valorem fee proportional to
the price, it is always optimal to use the entire information it has, i.e., if the platform observes the
product quality for a given consumer, the platform always recommends him/her to visit the firm
with the better product first. Lastly, in the Information Effect on the Market section I use these
results to analyze the effects of information on the quality of the product’s consumer purchases
and the welfare of market participants.
2.3.1 Consumer Search
For each consumer, the platform observes the quality of products with probability q. The
consumer does not know whether the platform observes his preferences. If the platform knows
consumer’s preferences, it provides the firm with a better product on the first position in the rank-
ing. With probability 1 − q, the platform does not know consumer’s preferences and ranks firms
randomly. Hence, each consumer uses the law of total probability, and expects that the first firm





to a low enough outside option, the consumer always explores the first firm. If both firms charge
the same price and the product of the first visited firm has quality z, the net benefit of visiting the




(ε− z)fε|z(ε)dε , (2.1)
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where fε|z(ε), described in Lemma 1, is consumer beliefs of the distribution of the second visited
firm’s product quality, conditional on the observed quality of the product provided by the first firm.
In the special case of q = 0, the platform does not know anything about consumer preferences
and shows products at random. Hence, the quality of the firms products is uncorrelated, and the
consumer simply expects fε(ε) to be a distribution of the second firm product quality. In such a
case, the model is reduced to Wolinsky (1986) model. If q > 0, the platform observes the quality
of products for some consumers, and steers them to visit the firm with the better product first. That
makes the quality of the second visited firms product to be correlated with the quality of the one
visited first. The higher q is, and the higher z the consumer observes in the first firm, then firmer
his belief is that the second product is the worse one, which weakens expectation about the quality
of the second product and the incentive to search further.
Lemma 1. In the region ε > z, fε|z can be expressed as:











The consumer’s reservation value x, which solves the equation s = h(x), is the product quality
such that the benefit of sampling one more product equals the search cost. If there is no difference
in product prices, then the consumer’s optimal strategy is to stop searching if the product quality is
higher than x. Otherwise, the consumer should explore the second product and purchase the better
one. The next two lemmas discuss how x depends on market parameters.
Lemma 2 shows, that in accordance with the classic result of Wolinsky (1986), if the search
cost increases, it becomes less profitable to explore the next product. As a result, x decreases.
Lemma 2. The reservation value x is a decreasing function of search cost s.
Lemma 3 highlights the idea that if the platform has better information (q increases), consumers
have lower incentives to search because the first explored product is the better one with a higher
probability.
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Lemma 3. The reservation value x is a decreasing function of q.
2.3.2 The Demand
Due to the ex-ante symmetry of firms, they have similar demand functions. Without loss of
generality I derive the demand function for firm A. Suppose firm A sets price pA, and firm B sets
the equilibrium price p∗. Define ∆ = pA − p∗. If the consumer visits firm A first, observes the
price pA and expects that the firm B charges the price p∗, he will stop the search and buy if and
only if εA − pA > x− p∗, or, same, εA > x+ ∆.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the demand for firm A. The shaded area in Figure 2.1a shows firm A’s
demand if it is visited first. If so, it gets the consumers for whom εA > x + ∆ (region I) because
these consumers buy from firm A immediately and don’t search further. Among the consumers who
sample both firms, firm A gets consumers who derive higher utility from consuming its product
rather than the product of firm B, i.e. for whom εA > εB + ∆ (region II). The shaded area in
Figure 2.1b shows the demand for firm A if it is visited second. If so, it gets the consumers for
whom εB < x and εA > εB + ∆ because first, these consumers don’t stop at firm B and search
further and, at second, they value the product of firm A higher than that of firm B. Since each firm




1 + F (x)
2




It’s important to note that the demand depends on q only through x.
Assuming that the search cost s is such that x ∈ [ε, ε̄] ∀q ∈ [0, 1], I now turn to the analysis
of the equilibrium. Note that in equilibrium D(p∗, p∗) = 1
2
, i.e. every consumer buys exactly one
product.
Assumption 1. f(·) is a log-concave and continuously differentiable function.
Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) show that under Assumption 1, F (·) and 1 − F (·) are also
log-concave.
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Figure 2.1: Demand for firms
(a) Demand if visited first (b) Demand if visited second
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium:
pA = pB = p














As Quint (2014) showed, log-concavity of f(ε), F (ε), and 1−F (ε) guarantees that the demand





is decreasing in p, which guarantees a unique solution of
Equation 2.3.
As shown in Lemma 4, the price is a function of x, which, in turn, is a function of the search
cost and the information the platform has. If s increases, then, in accordance with the classic
result of Wolinsky (1986), consumers search less often. If q increases, rational consumers expect
that the platform makes better ranking of firms and have lower expectations of the second firms
product quality, which weakens the incentives to search further. If consumers search less, the
market competitiveness declines and firms can raise prices. These results are summarized in the
next lemma.
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 1, p∗ is an increasing function of s and q.
The equilibrium price is an increasing function of q, while the firms’ demand is constant due to
a low enough outside option and full market coverage, and hence non-sensitive to the price. That
leads to an increase in the firms’ profits if the platform uses better information for ranking. Hence,
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as the platform charges firms an ad valorem fee proportional to the price, the platform’s revenue
is an increasing function of q, which guarantees that it is optimal for the platform to use the entire
information it has for ranking, i.e. always recommend the consumer to visit the firm with the better
product first if the platform observes the product quality for this consumer.
2.4 Information Effect on the Market
2.4.1 Information Effect on the Quality of Purchased Products
In this section, I address the main question of the paper: How would the quality of the product
that the consumer purchases vary depending on the information the platform has? On the one hand,
as the platform has better information and q increases, the product that the consumer explores first
is the better one with a higher probability, which improves the expected quality of the consumed
product. On the other hand, according to Lemma 3, as q increases, consumers have lower incentives
to search and visit the second firm less often, simply purchasing the first explored product. Hence,
consumers, who got a wrong recommendation on which firm to visit first, have smaller chances
to choose the better product. That reduces the expected quality of the consumed product. The
analysis in this chapter is designed to resolve the ambiguity in the combined effect.
The expected quality of the product, with which the consumer leaves the market, can be found
as described in Equation 2.4, where P (q) is the probability that the consumer purchases the worse
product. The first term in the sum stands for the expected quality of the better product, multiplied
by the probability the consumer purchases the better product. The second term stands for the
expected quality of the worse product, multiplied by the probability the consumer purchases the
worse product.
V (q) = (1− P (q)) ·
ε̄∫
ε
















1− (1− F (ε))2
]
(2.4)
Notice that the expected quality of the consumed product is a decreasing function of P (q) as
both integrals in Equation 2.5 are constants and stand for the quality of the better and the worse
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product among two respectively. In the subsequent analysis, I discuss how P (q), the probability
that the consumer purchases the worse product, varies depending on the information the platform
has.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the probabilities of different search outcomes. ε1 and ε2 stand for the
qualities of products of the first and the second firm in consumers’ search order, respectively.
Regions B and C have combined area 1+q
2
, and illustrate the mass of consumers who find the
better product in the first visited firm (ε1 > ε2). Accordingly, the regions A and D with combined
area 1−q
2
depict the mass of consumers who visit first the firm with the worse product (ε1 < ε2). In
regions B and C, the first visited firm’s product is the better one, and a consumer purchases this
product even if he visited the second firm. In regionD the product quality of the first visited firm is
below x; hence the consumer visits the second firm and purchases the better product. In region A,
the product quality of the first visited firm is above x; hence the consumer decides do not to search
further. But this product is the worse of the two. As a result, the region A is the only one where the
consumer leaves the market with the worse product. The probability of that event is represented as
the area of the region A in Figure 2.2 and is indicated in Equation 2.5.
Figure 2.2: Probabilities of the search outcomes







Differentiating Equation 2.5 with respect to q, we get:
∂P (q)
∂q
= −(1− F (x))
2
2
− (1− q)f(x)(1− F (x))∂x
∂q
(2.6)
The first term in the sum is the direct effect of increased q, which is always negative and expresses
a reduction in the share of consumers who visit the firm with the worse product first. The second
term is always positive and stands for the indirect effect explained by a reduction in the consumer
search intensity and is associated with the level of this reduction ∂x
∂q
. If consumers decrease the
search intensity enough in response to increased q, making ∂P (q)
∂q
positive, then the indirect effect
of decreased search incentives outweighs the direct effect of a better recommendation, hurting the
average quality of purchased products. The condition of that is given in Equation 2.7.
∂x
∂q
< − 1− F (x)
2(1− q)f(x)
(2.7)
Figure 2.3 illustrates the Equation 2.7 under Assumption 2. The inequality holds for high
enough x, or, same, low enough s. Hence, for a low enough search cost, the indirect effect out-
weighs the direct one, and the average quality of consumed products decreases if the platform has
better information.
Assumption 2. Product quality ε is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Figure 2.3: Illustration of Equation 2.7. The case of a uniform distribution.
(a) As functions of reservation value x (b) As functions of search cost s
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Proposition 1 summarizes this result for the general case. The proposition states that, in the
case of a high search cost, the expected quality of a purchased product increases with the platform
having better information, while in the case of a low enough search cost, it decreases at first and
starts to increase thereafter.
Proposition 1. There exist ŝ and ˆ̂s s.t. ŝ ≤ ˆ̂s and
1. for any s, s.t. s > ˆ̂s, the expected quality of a consumed product increases in q.
2. for any s, s.t. 0 < s < ŝ, there exists q̂(s) s.t.
(a) for any q, s.t. q > q̂(s), the expected quality of a consumed product increases in q.
(b) for any q, s.t. q < q̂(s), the expected quality of a consumed product decreases in q.
the expected quality of a consumed product decreases in q.
Under Assumption 2, ŝ = ˆ̂s
The logic behind the proposition is as follows. If a consumer gets a correct recommendation,
i.e., visits the firm with the better product first, then, due to firms charge equal prices, he will
purchase this product regardless of whether he visits the second firm or not. Therefore, the quality
of the product this consumer purchases is unaffected by either the direct or the indirect effect. As
a result, both the direct and the indirect effects affect only the consumers, who visit the firm with
the worse product first. Further in this paragraph, I focus only on these consumers. Regarding the
direct effect, its magnitude increases with the value of the search cost. For a high search cost, or,
same, a low x, the direct effect is large because all consumers, who got the product with quality
above x, do not visit the second firm. All these consumers are benefiting from an increase in
q, because it strengthens the chance they would get a correct recommendation and visit the firm
providing a product, which is better for them, first. Now I turn to the discussion of the indirect
effect, which is driven by a consumer’s beliefs. The consumer does not know whether the platform
observes his preferences, hence, he/she is not sure if the product of the first visited firm is the
better one. The consumer makes a decision whether to visit the second firm based on the search
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cost and the expected gain of search, which depends on the consumer’s beliefs as to whether the
second firm provides the better product, i.e. the platform made a wrong recommendation on what
firm to visit first. The consumer uses the quality of the product found in the first visited firm as a
signal to estimate the probability that the second one provides the better product. The higher the
product quality the consumer finds in the first visited firm, the firmer his belief is that the second
firm provides the worse product. The indirect effect affects only the consumers, who, first, got the
worse product in the first visited firm, and second, got the product with quality slightly below x,
because only these consumers will change their decision not to search and will end up with the
worse product as a result of the indirect effect. As mentioned above, the consumer uses the quality
of the product he found in the first visited firm to predict the expected gain of visiting the second
firm. Hence, if such a consumer observes high product quality in the first visited firm, he believes
that this product is the better one with a high probability. As a result, such a consumer dramatically
lowers the search intensity in response to an increase in q, which makes the indirect effect large
compared to the direct one, which is small for a small search cost as discussed above. As a result,
the indirect effect outweighs the direct one in the case of a low search cost. If the search cost is
high, x is low, which, as discussed above, makes the direct effect large. Therefore, the direct effect
outweighs the indirect one.
2.4.2 Information Effect on Welfare
Due to a sufficiently low outside option, all consumers search at least once, and search the
second time only if the quality of the first product is below x. The first explored product is the
better one for 1+q
2
portion of consumers, while for the remaining mass of consumers 1−q
2
, the first
product is the worse one. As a result, the level of the consumer’s search expenditures can be
expressed as shown in Equation 2.8.



















1− (1− F (x))2
))
(2.8)
When the platform has better information about consumer preferences, there are two effects.
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First, there is a higher probability that consumers get the better product at the first visited firm.
Second, consumers expect lower quality of the second product. Both effects lower consumers
incentives to search. This result is summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 6. Search expenditures are a decreasing function of q.
Define the Total Surplus in Equation 2.9 as
TS(q) = V (q)− SE(q) (2.9)
Lemma 6 shows that SE(q) is decreasing in q. Proposition 1 gives the condition, under which
V (q) is increasing and decreasing in q. Hence the net effect may be ambiguous. Proposition 2
provides conditions under which the Total Surplus is decreasing and increasing in q.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2, for any q ∈ [0, 1), there exist š and ˇ̌s s.t. š ≤ ˇ̌s and
1. for any s, s.t. 0 < s < š, the total economic welfare locally decreases in q.
2. for any s, s.t. s > ˇ̌s, the total economic welfare locally increases in q.
For a low enough search cost, as q increases, the savings in search expenditures are relatively
small and outweighed by the reduction in the quality of the product that the consumer purchases. If
the search cost is above ŝ, defined in Proposition 1, the quality of the purchased product increases
with q, while the search expenditures decreases, hence, both effects increase the Total Surplus. In
the intermediate case š < s < ˇ̌s the savings in the search expenditures are comparatively high and
outweigh the reduction in the quality of the product that the consumer purchases.
According to Lemma 5, the price increases in q, while, according to Proposition 2, for a low
enough search cost, the Total Surplus decreases in q. Hence, if s is low, the Consumer Surplus,
defined in Equation 2.10, decreases in q. However. for a high enough search cost, the Total Surplus
is an increasing function of q. Therefore, the effect of increased q on the Consumer Surplus is
ambiguous in the general case and depends on the levels of s and q. This result is summarized in
Proposition 3.
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CS(q) = V (q)− SE(q)− p∗(q) (2.10)
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 2, for any q ∈ [0, 1), there exists s̃ and ˜̃s s.t. s̃ ≤ ˜̃s and
1. for any s, s.t. 0 < s < s̃, the consumer welfare locally decreases in q.
2. for any s, s.t. s > ˜̃s, the consumer welfare locally increases in q.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the compositions of s and q which lead to different changes of the market
outcomes in case of uniform distribution ε. If s > 1
2
, then x < 0 = ε, hence, consumers never
explore the second product. Therefore, if q increases, the price does not change and the Consumer
Surplus increases, as does the Total Surplus. If 0 < s < 1
2
and 0 < q < 1, then 0 < x < 1 and
the consumers who explored the product with quality below x, search the second product as well.
Consistent with Proposition 1, for low enough search cost s, the expected quality of the consumed
product is decreasing with q. Moreover, according to Figure 2.4a, the Consumer Surplus increases
with q for a high enough search cost because the effects of increased quality of the consumed
product and decreased search expenditures outweigh the increase in the price.
Figure 2.4: The effect of levels of search costs s and platform’s information q on market outcomes.
The case of uniform distribution.
(a) The effect on the product quality
and consumers’ welfare (b) The effect on the total economic welfare
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2.5 Concluding Remark
The paper discusses markets with consumer search frictions and a partially informed interme-
diary. The main finding is that, with an improvement in the information the intermediary has about
consumer preferences, the average quality of the product consumers purchase might decrease. The
intuition behind the mechanism is as follows: if the intermediary has better information and gives
better advice to consumers on what product to explore first, consumers have lower expectations
about the quality of the next products and explore them less often, which reduces the number of
explored products and might lower the quality of the one chosen. I also show that consumers and
the whole economy can benefit or be hurt if the intermediary has more information about prefer-
ences and can better manipulate the order, in which consumers explore products. The actual effect
depends on the search costs. In the case of a low enough search cost, the consumer welfare and
the total welfare decrease if the platform has better information, while in the case of a high enough
search cost, both types of welfare increase.
One of the possible extensions of the model for further research is to reduce the monopoly
power of the intermediary, for example, by introducing competition between intermediaries. That
will force the intermediary to incorporate the consumer surplus in its objective function. It is
particularly important that, in this case, the intermediary may prefer not to use all the information
it has about consumer preferences and to steer the search order to keep the incentives for the firm
not to raise prices too much.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Proof. of Lemma 1
Suppose that ε1, ε2 and ξ are mutually independent, where Pr(ξ = 1) = 1− Pr(ξ = 0) = 1−q2
and ε1, ε2 are identically distributed with density f(ε). Let V = min{ε1, ε2} andW = max{ε1, ε2}
and define X = ξ · V + (1− ξ) ·W , Y = (1− ξ) · V + ξ ·W . I seek for fY |X(y|x) on the region
where y > x.
Step 1. Joint density for (V,W )
The joint cdf for (V,W ) for w ≥ v given by:
FV,W (v, w) = Pr(V ≤ v,W ≤ w)
= Pr(ε1 ≤ v, v < ε2 ≤ w) + Pr(v < ε1 ≤ w, ε2 ≤ v) + Pr(ε1 ≤ v, ε2 ≤ v) =
= 2F (v)[F (u)− F (v)] + F (v)2
So the density is given by:
fV,W (v, w) =
d2FV,W (v, w)
dvdw
= 2f(v)f(w), for v ≤ w
Step 2. Joint density for (X, Y )
X and Y are functions of (V,W, ξ), so I first derive the density for (X, Y, ξ) = g(V,W, ξ).
It follows that g−1(x, y, ξ) = (ξx + (1 − ξ)y, (1 − ξ)x + ξy, q) with Jacobian J(x, y, ξ) =
ξ 1− ξ x− y
1− ξ ξ y − x
0 0 1
,
so |detJ(x, y, ξ)| = |ξ2 − (1− ξ)2| · 1 = |ξ − (1− ξ)| = |1− 2ξ| = 1
Hence the density for (X, Y, ξ) is given by
fX,Y,ξ(x, y, ξ) = fV,W (ξx+ (1− ξ)y, (1− ξ)x+ ξy) · fξ(ξ)
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where I used that ξ is independent of (ε1, ε2) and therefore also independent of (V,W ). Next
I obtain the density for (X, Y ) by integrating out ξ.
fX,Y (x, y) =
1−q
2




It follows that fX,Y (x, y)Ix<y = 1−q2 fV,W (x, y)Ix<y because fV,W (y, x) = 0 for x < y.
Step 3. Marginal density for X .




















































Step 4. Conditional density of Y given X .

































) = 1−q2 (1− F (x))1−q
2





Proof. of Lemma 2
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) < 0 ∀ (q, x) ∈ [0, 1)× [ε, ε̄)
The alternative expression is ∂x
∂s
= − 1−q+2qF (x)
2qsf(x)+(1−q)(1−F (x))
Proof. of Lemma 3




































































) < 0 ∀ (q, x) ∈ [0, 1)× [ε, ε̄)
The alternative expression is ∂x
∂q
= − 2sF (x)
(1−q)(2qsf(x)+(1−q)(1−F (x)))
Proof. of Lemma 5




2 + (1− F (x))f ′(x)(



















Proof. of Proposition 1
Equation 2.6 can be rewritten as:
















) = 1 (A.1)
Λ(x, q) is continuous function of x. Λ(0, q) = 0, lim
x→ε̂
Λ(x, q) = 2
1+q
> 1 ∀q ∈ [0, 1). Hence,
∃ŝ s.t. Λ(x(ŝ), q) = 0, ∀s > ŝ : Λ(x(s), q) > 0 and
∃ˆ̂s s.t. Λ(x(ˆ̂s), q) = 0, ∀s > ˆ̂s : Λ(x(s), q) < 0




(1− x)2((2− q)x− 1)
2(qx+ 1)
,
which is positive if x > 1
2−q (low s) and negative if x <
1
2−q (high s).
x is a continuous and decreasing function of s. Also, if s = 1
2
, then x = 0, and if s = 0, then
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x = 1. Hence, for any q ∈ [0, 1) we always can chose s such that makes x equals any desired
number between 0 and 1.
As a result, for any q̂ ∈ [0, 1), exists ŝ such that x(ŝ) = 1
2−q̂ . For any s > ŝ, x(s) < x(ŝ) and
∂P (q)
∂q
is negative. While for any s < ŝ, x(s) > x(ŝ) and ∂P (q)
∂q
is positive.
Proof. of Lemma 6
After differentiating Equation 2.8 we have:
∂SE
∂q
= −s(1− F (x))F (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0






Proof. of Proposition 2
Under Assumption 2, Equation 2.9 can be expressed as:
TS(q) =
−q2 (−3x2 + x+ 1) (1− x)2 + q (−3x4 + 10x3 − 6x2 + 2x+ 1) + x(x+ 1)(5− 3x)
6(1− q(1− 2x))





(1− x)2 (− (q2 + q − 4)x− 3(3− q)qx3 − (6− (11− q)q)x2 − q + 1)
6(qx+ 1)(1− q(1− 2x))
,


















equals 1 if x = 1.
Hence, for any q ∈ [0, 1), there is exist š s.t. q = q̌. For any s < š, q > q̌, resulting in
∂TS(q)
∂q
< 0. For any s > š, q < q̌, and ∂TS(q)
∂q
> 0
Fix any q ∈ [0, 1). There is exist š when x is such that q = q̌. For any s < š, q > q̌, resulting
in ∂TS(q)
∂q




Proof. of Proposition 3.
According to Proposition 2, Total Surplus decreases in q for low enough search cost, while,
Lemma 5 states that price always increases in q. Therefore, Consumer Surplus, defined in Equa-
tion 2.10 as the difference of Total Surplus and price, decreases for low enough search cost, which
means ∀q ∈ [0, 1), ∃s̃ s.t. ∀s < s̃ : Consumer Surplus decreases in q.
Plug in Equation 2.10 V (q), SE(q) and p∗(q), defined in Equation 2.4, Equation 2.8 and Equa-
tion 2.3 respectively and differentiate with respect to q we get:
∂CS
∂q
= (1− F (x))f(ε)
(





















The expression above is continuous function of x.
Plug expression for ∂x
∂q
, found in Proof of Proposition 3 and plug s =
ε̄∫
z





(ε− x)f(ε) dε and estimate ∂CS
∂q








εf(ε)(2F (ε)− 1) dε > 0 (A.3)
Hence, due to ∂CS
∂q
is continuous in x, ∀q ∈ [0, 1), ∃˜̃s s.t. ∀s > ˜̃s : Consumer Surplus increases in
q.
Under Assumption 2, differentiating Equation 2.10 with respect to q and plugging in s =
ε̄∫
x
(ε− x)fε|x(ε)dε = (1−q)(1−x)
2











3q(1− q)(3− q)x6 + 2(1− q)
(
3− q − q2
)
x5 + (1− q)
(









3− 2q + 13q2 − 2q3
)
x2 − (1− q)(1 + q)2x+ (1− q)2
]
The first, fractional multiplier is non-negative ∀(q, x) ∈ [0, 1)× [0, 1]. Next I show that λ(x, q)
is negative for high x (low s), positive for low x (high s) and strictly monotone decreasing in x
(increasing in s), which will prove the proposition. First, λ(0, q) = (1 − q)2 > 0 and λ(1, q) =
−6(1 + q) < 0. Second, ∂λ
∂x
< 0 ∀(q, x) ∈ [0, 1) × [0, 1]. Hence ∀q̃ ∃s̃ s.t. λ(x(s̃), q̃) = 0 and
∀s < s̃, λ(x(s), q̃) < 0, making ∂CS
∂q
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